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China’s Withdrawal of Article 96 of the
CISG: A Roadmap for the United States and
China to Reconsider Withdrawing the
Article 95 Reservation
Pan Zhen*
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG) was created for the purpose of providing
legal neutrality and certainty, and also for the purpose of avoiding
choice of law issues in international sales of goods. However, the
United States and China, the two largest trading nations in the
world, made the Article 95 reservation at the time they ratified the
CISG, therefore restricting CISG’s applicability in certain
situations. In 2013, China withdrew its Article 96 reservation,
which declares its non-recognition of free form of contract
formation, taking one step closer to the vast majority of CISG
Contracting States. The reasons behind this withdrawal suggest
that China will likely withdraw the Article 95 reservation in the
foreseeable future. Meanwhile, there are additional grounds
convincing the U.S. to withdraw its Article 95 reservation. In
order to develop uniform legal regimes governing international
sales, both the U.S. and China, as major trading countries, should
withdraw their respective reservation on the Article 95 (made in
1988) and promote CISG’s application with full acceptance.

*
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, the growing trend of globalization has led to more business
transactions conducted at the international level. The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) had the
foresight back in the 1980s to develop the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”),1 for the purpose
of providing a uniform regime, and introducing legal certainty in
commercial exchanges so as to reduce transaction costs.2 Since it became
1

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu [hereinafter
“CISG”].
2
United Nations Conventions on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Vienna, 1980), UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html (last visited Aug.
14, 2016).
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effective in 1988, the CISG has been accepted by most major trading
nations in the world.3 As of May 2016, eighty-five countries have ratified
the CISG,4 demonstrating worldwide recognition of its applicability to
contract disputes in international goods transactions. The United States
(“U.S.”) and the People’s Republic of China (“China”), the two largest
trading nations,5 ratified the CISG immediately when the treaty came into
force in 1988.6 However, both countries made the Article 95 reservation,7
prohibiting the application of the CISG where at least one party to the
contract does not have its place of business in a country that has ratified
the CISG (“CISG State” or “Contracting State”).8 Unfortunately, the effect
of this reservation turns out to be problematic. Not only has the reservation
impeded the development of the CISG, but it has also raised controversies
among both national and foreign courts and tribunals about its
enforcement.9
In addition to the Article 95 reservation, China also made a reservation
essentially equivalent to the Article 96 reservation at the time it ratified
the CISG.10 The effect of this reservation is that the reserving State will
3

A total of ten countries, including the United States, China, France, and Italy, ratified
the CISG by its effective date, January 1, 1988. Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and
Singapore, among others, adopted the CISG in the 1990s. Recently, Japan and Brazil
ratified the Convention in 2009 and 2014, respectively. Status–United Nations
Conventions on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980), UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en
/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_ status.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2016); See Top 20
export countries worldwide in 2015 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statis
ta.com/statistics/264623/leading-export-countries-worldwide/.
4
Status–United Nations Conventions on the Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (Vienna, 1980).
5
Top 20 export countries worldwide in 2015 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, http://
www.statista.com/statistics/264623/leading-export-countries-worldwide/.
6
See Table of Contracting States, ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE–CISG BY
STATE, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last visited
Aug. 14, 2016) (providing a computer generated list of cases for each contracting state in
the convention).
7
China (PRC), ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE–TABLE OF CONTRACTING
STATES, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-China.html;
United States, ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE–TABLE OF CONTRACTING
STATES, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-United.html.
8
See discussion infra Part III.1.b, III.2.
9
Asa Markel, American, English and Japanese Warranty Law Compared: Should the
U.S. Reconsider Her Article 95 Declaration to the CISG?, 21 PACE INT’L L. REV. 163, 173
(2009).
10
Declarations and State interpretations, ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE TABLE OF CONTRACTING STATES, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/countries/contract.html (“China (PRC) has filed a similar declaration, but it is not
couched in the precise phraseology called for by Article 96.”); see also Xiaolin Wang &
Camilla Baasch Andersen, The Chinese Declaration Against Oral Contracts Under the
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not be bound by the free form of contract formation under Article 11, and
require enforceable contracts (of international sales of goods) be
concluded in or evidenced by writing.11 With the great economic reform
in Chinese politics and significant changes in its legal system in the late
1990s, China has been envisioning itself as an active participant in
international business transactions since the twenty-first century.12 In
2013, China withdrew its Article 96 reservation,13 recognizing that
contracts under the CISG may be concluded in or evidenced by any
means.14 This withdrawal took China one step closer to the vast majority
of CISG States.
In Part II, this comment will briefly introduce the background of the
CISG, including the reasons for the insertion of Article 95 and Article 96
reservations during the draft process. It will examine the grounds behind
China’s decision to make both reservations, in view of its conservative
attitude in conducting international transactions and the old Chinese
contract law in 1980s, followed by an analysis of discussions among
scholars for China’s withdrawal of the Article 96 reservation. Part III will
delve into the suggestion that the grounds which convinced China to
withdraw its Article 96 reservation may also lead China to withdraw the
Article 95 reservation in the foreseeable future, therefore accepting the full
text of the CISG. Part IV will explore whether, in addition to the common
bases that might persuade China to withdraw the Article 95 reservation,
there are unique reasons encouraging the U.S. to withdraw the same
reservation so as to fully promote the application of the CISG in governing
international sales. Part V will conclude that the Article 95 reservation
impedes both Chinese and American traders’ use of the CISG, and that the
increasing recognition of the CISG by major trading countries and the
development of the CISG case laws have diminished the necessity for
making the Article 95 reservation. This comment argues that both China
and the U.S. should promote CISG’s application with full acceptance. In
view of their leading roles in global trade, it will be parochial for both
countries to keep this reservation.

CISG, 8 VJ 145, 164 n. 5 (2004) (“This difference in declaration language would seem to
be without significance regarding the effect of the declaration.”).
11
CISG arts. 11, 96.
12
See Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains Are High and the Emperor Is
Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 459-60 (2003); see also
Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 154-56.
13
China (PRC), ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE—TABLE OF CONTRACTING
STATES, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-China.html;
United States, ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE - TABLE OF CONTRACTING
STATES, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-United.html.
14
See CISG art. 11.
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CHINA’S ARTICLE 96 RESERVATION AND ITS SUBSEQUENT
WITHDRAWAL
General History of the CISG

In view of the differences in contract law between common law and
civil law, the CISG aims at providing parties, whose places of business are
in different nations, with legal neutrality and legal certainty for
international sales of goods.15 The law was drafted in diplomatic working
group of the United Nations to accommodate different legal systems and
cultures among developed and developing countries.16 The CISG governs
formation of contracts,17 obligations of sellers and buyers and pertinent
remedies for breaches of contract,18 forms of contract,19 among others. The
law strikes a careful balance between the interests of the buyer and the
seller, avoids recourse to private international law in determining the
applicable law governing global trades, and ensures reliability and
predictability of international sales contracts.20 Small and medium-sized
enterprises benefit most from such assurance, as their lack of bargaining
power makes them more vulnerable to problems caused by inadequate
treatment in the contract of issues relating to applicable law.21 Traders
agree on the CISG so that neither side has to deal with the uncertainty
about the applicable law to which they are not familiar.22 The principle of
having a uniform, fair legal regime governing international contracts
ensures the contractual balance and reduces the burden on merchants of
studying different nations’ law before negotiating contracts.23 The fact that
countries ratified the CISG one after the other reflects the popularity of the
CISG, showing the significance of legal importance for parties operating
from different countries and legal systems.24

15
United Nations Conventions on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Vienna, 1980), UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html (last visited Aug.
14, 2016).
16
Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, 149.
17
CISG part II.
18
CISG part III.
19
Id. art. 11.
20
United Nations Conventions on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Vienna, 1980).
21
Id.
22
See Markel, supra note 9, at 164.
23
United Nations Conventions on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Vienna, 1980).
24
John Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48 WAYNE
L. REV. 1387, 1439 (2003).
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The CISG directly applies to contracts of sales of goods made between
parties from Contracting States.25 Where at least one party’s place of
business is from a non-Contracting State, the CISG may nevertheless
govern the transaction pursuant to Article 1(1)(b) in the event the private
international law” lead[s] to the application of the law of a Contracting
State.”26 Article 95 of the CISG allows a Contracting State to restrict the
applicability in the latter situation by declaring at the time of depositing its
ratification instrument that the State will not be bound by Article 1(1)(b).27
This reservation was proposed by Czechoslovakia, in representing
socialist countries that were members of the Council for Mutual Economic
Cooperation (“COMECON”), in order to protect their uniform trade law
regime.28 COMECON countries, instead of dealing with each other at
arm’s length, “owed one another a duty ‘to obtain mutually satisfactory
results,’ as measured by the applicable national economic plan.”29 In view
of this culture, the contract law among COMECON countries at that time
was so comprehensively designed to ensure the predictability among
trading parties, and the interest of their state-operated enterprises.30 There
was barely any room to incorporate provisions in the CISG into their
“standard” contract.31 In order to avoid that the rules of private
international law displace the COMECON rules with the CISG pursuant
to Article 1(1)(b) where COMECON rules would otherwise apply,
socialist countries demanded a reservation not to apply the CISG where at
least one party to the transaction is not from a Contracting State.32
Therefore, the UNCITRAL added the Article 95 to the CISG.33
The success of the CISG is due largely to its wide acceptability. The
United Nations, learning from the failure of its prior conventions (e.g., the
1964 Hague conventions) because of a lack of compromise to nonWestern cultures, the United Nations became aware of the importance of
making the CISG flexible.34 After a lengthy and diplomatic drafting
process, the flexibility was achieved through reservations regarding
unique public policy behind certain Contracting States.35 One of the
examples is Article 96. Following common law’s flexible contract

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

CISG art. 1(1)(a).
Id. 1(1)(b).
CISG art. 95 (emphasis added).
Markel, supra note 9, at 171.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 146.
Id.
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formation,36 the CISG does not require a contract of sale to be in writing,
therefore permitting contracts to be formed by any means, including
witnesses under Article 11.37 However, this relaxed standard runs afoul of
the culture of socialist countries, under which “certainty, foreseeability,
and lack of surprises are deemed essential” for state-operated societies.38
In furtherance of the need for socialist countries to maintain established
patterns for foreign trade contracts, the Soviet Union emphasized the
importance to strictly stick to written form in cross-border contracts at the
1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference.39 As a result, Article 96 came into
existence, allowing a country “whose legislation requires contracts of sale
to be concluded in or evidenced by writing” to make a reservation at any
time, rendering Article 11 inapplicable to a party whose business place is
in that country.40 It represents a compromise between the freedom of
contract formation in Article 11 and the notion of formal requirements
appealing to socialist countries.41

2.
China’s Open Door Policy and Reform—from Planning
Economy to Market–Oriented Economy
Before 1978, China focused on a “planned economy,” under which the
State was the sole owner of the assets of the whole country.42 There was
no legislation on contract law, and all trade that took place in China was
“subject to very exacting quantitative guidelines by the State.”43 Under this
approach, China experienced economic stagnation and a sharp decrease in
the volume of international trade from 1.5% in 1953 to 0.6% in 1977.44 In
addressing these problems, China adopted an open door policy and
committed to promoting international transactions through legal and
economic reform.45
36
See generally Markel, supra note 9, at 164 (“the CISG, with its tolerance of oral terms
and agreements, represented a major compromise for many socialist countries that
preferred clear, written terms in cross-border contracts.”).
37
CISG art. 11.
38
Sara G. Zwart, The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between Socialist,
Third World, Common, and Civil Law Principles, 13 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 109,
116 (1988).
39
Xiao Yongping & Long Weidi, Selected Topics on the Application of the CISG in
China, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 61, 83-84 (2008).
40
CISG art. 96 (emphasis added).
41
Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 147.
42
Lee Branstetter and Nicholas Lardy, China’s Embrace of Globalization 4 (NBER
Working Paper No. w12373, 2006), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=918971.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See James C. Hitchingham, Stepping Up to the Needs of the International Market
Place: An Analysis of the 1999 “Uniform” Contract Law of the People’s Republic of
China, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 8, 1-2 (2000).
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In the early years of its experimental reform, the State still controlled
foreign trade in an attempt to maintain stability through gradual political
democratization.46 International businesses were conducted solely through
State-owned foreign trade corporations, which acted as agents on behalf
of the country, and did not own rights or obligations to share the profits
and risks resulting from any transactions.47 Because the staff in charge of
such businesses at that time were generally not experienced, skilled
traders, nor were they sensitive to merchant customs, in view of those
veteran foreign parties, it was essential for the State to pay close attention
over the process of contract formation, its modification, and termination
to prevent any potential loophole.48
Recognizing the need to enact contract laws in supporting such
economic modernization, China promulgated the Foreign-Related
Economic Contract Law (“FECL”) in 1985.49 With a similar ground to the
Soviet Union in protecting State-owned entities,50 the law explicitly
mandated that the formation, modification, or rescission of contracts at
global levels be evidenced in writing,51 in contrast to the relaxed formation
requirement that recognizes oral contracts for domestic trade.52 The
requirement of formal formation of contracts was somehow an extension
of State control of contracts.53
As a result, when China ratified the CISG in 1988, the Chinese
contract law at that time was in contrast with Article 11 of the CISG.
Therefore, China made the Article 96 reservation so as not to enforce oral
contracts under Article 11.54 In view of the short transition period from
closed-market policies of a socialist regime to market-oriented economy,
China was not sophisticated enough to deal with contract rules for
international sales of good, or to identify what forms of communication

46

Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 154.
See id. at 156.
48
See id.
49
See Hitchingham, supra note 45, at 1-2.
50
Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 83-84.
51
Foreign Economic Contract Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 21, 1985, effective Jul. 1, 1985), translation available at http://www.lawinfo
china.com/display.aspx?id=55&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=
[hereinafter “FECL”] art.7 (“A contract shall be formed as soon as the parties to it have
reached a written agreement on the terms and have signed the contract. If an agreement is
reached merely by means of letters, telegrams or telex and one party requests a signed letter
of confirmation, the contract shall be formed only after the letter of confirmation is
signed . . . .”); art 32 (“Notices or agreements on the modification or rescission of contracts
shall be made in writing.”).
52
Hitchingham, supra note 45, at 1-2.
53
Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 56.
54
CISG art. 96.
47
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might constitute forms of contracts apart from writing.55 As such skills
could not be mastered overnight, it was logical and understandable for
China to make the reservation to protect its traders from falling into the
traps of oral contract formation.56

3.
The Aggravation of the Ambiguous Effect of the Article 96
Reservation by UCL
The effect of the Article 96 reservation generated considerable debates
among scholars. Some held the view that merely because one of the
contracting parties is from a State that reserved the Article 96, it does not
necessarily require contracts entered into by that party be concluded only
in writing.57 Instead, the private international law governs: when there is
an exclusion of any provisions of the CISG,58 the rules of conflicts law of
the forum shall come into play in determining which formalities will
apply.59 If the private international law leads to the law of a country which
does not require writing to enforce a contract, written form is not
mandatory.60 In other words, a contract need not be evidenced by writing
to have it enforceable, unless the private international law selects the law
of an Article 96-reserving State.61 This is reportedly considered as the
“prevailing view.”62 On the other hand, some argued that the Article 96
reservation imposed on the declaring State an obligation to only enforce
written contracts.63 While such interpretation appears to be in line with a
declaring State’s purpose in making the reservation, this argument is not
convincing in that a proposal to phrase the reservation in this way was
rejected.64 Thus, the effect of the Article 96 reservation should be
construed only as a relief of the declaring State from an obligation to
recognize contracts in all forms under its national law, rather than
imposing additional obligation on its courts and tribunals to only enforce
written contracts.

55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 154.
Id.
See Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 84.
See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 84.
Id.
Zhao Yuyi (赵玉意), Ping Zhongguo dui CISG Feishumian Xingshi Guiding Baoliu

de Lilun he Shijian (评中国对CISG 非书面形式规定保留的理论和实践) [Comments on
the Theories and Practice of China’s Reservation of Written Form of Contracts under the
CISG], 2, Henan University of Economics and Law Journal, 173, 175 (2014) (China).
62
See Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 84 n. 93.
63
Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 162.
64
Id.
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The application of the Article 96 reservation became more
questionable after China’s enactment of its new contract law, Uniform
Contract Law (“UCL”), in 1999.65 The opening of the Chinese markets to
trade and foreign investment produced outstanding results, with an
average annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) of over ten
percent (or 10%) from 1980 to 1990.66 In anticipation of its admission to
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and its active role in global
transactions in the twenty-first century, China promulgated the UCL to
bring its business practice into conformity and coherence with the general
Western practices.67 By doing so, the UCL repeals a certain number of its
old contract laws, including the FECL, and unifies the rest of the contract
laws to govern both domestic trade and international transactions. In
representing the modernization of trade in China, the UCL provides
freedom and flexibility in contract formation.68 Article 10 of the UCL
explicitly provides that a contract may be formed orally.69 Consequently,
a problem arose because the relaxed standard on contract formation under
the UCL contradicted the Article 96 reservation China made.
Before China’s withdrawal of its Article 96 reservation in 2013,
confusion existed over the choice of law in determining the formation of
the contract.70 Some scholars advocated that the enactment of the UCL did
not invalidate the Article 96 reservation in that where a domestic provision
is conflict with a provision in the treaty, the treaty prevails.71 Under this
theory, when a Chinese party deals with a party from a CISG state, the
CISG would govern the dispute under Article 1(1)(a),72 and Chinese
judges would more likely, in applying the reservation, require contract
formation to be reduced in writing. As discussed above, such construction
seemed to be more in keeping with the original concern for the
reservation.73 On the other hand, if the judge adopted the prevailing view
under the private international law rules in deciding the validity of contract
formation, assuming the rules of conflicts law led Chinese law to apply, a
contract would not be subject to only written form under the UCL.
Therefore, without a uniform application, different approaches applied by
65

Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), translation available at http://www.lawinfo
china.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6145&CGid= [hereinafter “UCL”].
66
Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 154 n. 28.
67
Pattison & Herron, supra note 12, at 460.
68
Hitchingham, supra note 45, at 2-3.
69
UCL art. 10.
70
Cf. Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 161.
71
E.g., Zhao, supra note 61, at 175.
72
CISG art. 1(1)(a) (The CISG applies to contracts between parties from different States
“when the States are Contracting States”).
73
See Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 85; see also Zhao, supra note 61, at 176.

2016-2017]

CHINA'S WITHDRAWL OF ART. 96 OF THE CISG

151

Chinese courts and tribunal would cause completely opposite results under
the same facts.
In the event that a Chinese party dealt with another from a non-CISG
State, the disparate treatment would be much more obvious. Under Article
1(1)(b), the CISG will govern the dispute when the rules of private
international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State,
despite that one of the contracting parties is from a non-CISG State.74
Because of China’s reservation under Article 95, Article 1(1)(b) is
inapplicable.75 As a result, if the private international law leads Chinese
law to apply, the UCL, rather the CISG, will govern the dispute. Due to
the fact that under this new law, contracts may be concluded in any form,
such different requirement of contract enforcement between the Article 96
reservation and the UCL would somehow provide a preferential treatment,
i.e., freedom of contract form, to parties from non-CISG States;
ridiculously imposing a harsher standard to CISG allies by mandating
contracts be formed only in writing.

4.

Reasons for China’s Withdrawal

The enormous changes took that place in China’s legal system and
foreign policy provides grounds for China to withdraw its Article 96
reservation. Firstly, the reservation had no independent significance, given
China’s rapid economic development of decades since it made the
reservation in 1988. The conservative position was gone, in view of
China’s open attitude towards international trade by joining the WTO. The
fact that China’s new contract law, the UCL, was drafted with great
influence from the CISG also demonstrates China’s policy favoring
international commerce and the evolution of Chinese contract law getting
closer to the mainstream of the world.76 Additionally, because the Article
96 reservation was incompatible with the UCL and against the concept of
flexible contract formation under the CISG, withdrawal of Article 96
reservation eliminates confusion caused by different treatments of the
reservation due to lack of uniform application by Chinese courts and
tribunals, ensures legal coherence in the determination of contract
formation, and enhances confidence of foreign parties in Sino-foreign
sales of goods contracts with Chinese merchants. Further, withdrawal
avoids the uncertainty as to China’s entitlement to an Article 96
reservation, given the replacement of the FECL by the UCL renders
contract formation subject to any form. Article 96 starts with the
74

CISG art. 1(1)(b).
See discussion infra Part III.2.
76
See Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 62 (“the CISG has not only witnessed, but has
also greatly influenced, the evolution of Chinese domestic contract law.”).
75
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requirement that “[a] Contracting State whose legislation requires
contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by writing may at any
time make a declaration . . . .”77 It is clear that Article 10 of the UCL
renders China disqualified for the requirements embodied in the Article 96
reservation. Thus, on a legal technicality, China was no longer eligible for
an Article 96 reservation since the UCL brought into force.

III.

ARTICLE 95—A RESERVATION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
CISG

1.

Broad Application under Article 1
a. Direct Application

To remove any legal barriers among merchants doing businesses at an
international level, the main goals of the CISG are to provide legal
certainty and promote the development of international trade through a
broad application of uniform law.78 Two paths of application, direct and
indirect, have been adopted under the CISG. By virtue of Article 1(1)(a),
the CISG directly applies where contracts are between parties from CISG
States.79 There are three strict conditions of applying the CISG under this
subsection: (1) as the provision demonstrates, by the time a contract is
concluded the places of business of each party must have joined the
CISG;80 (2) the parties have not expressly or implicitly excluded the CISG
pursuant to Article 6;81 and (3) the forum must locate in a CISG State,
otherwise it will not be obligated to observe Article 1(1)(a) or apply the
CISG, even if Article 1(1)(a) is satisfied.82 Thus, the direct application of
the CISG can be summarized as:

77

CISG art. 96.
See United Nations Conventions on the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Vienna, 1980), UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html.
79
CISG art. 1(1)(a).
80
Id. art. 1(2).
81
Article 6 provides that parties may exclude the application of this Convention or,
subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.
82
Li Wei, On China’s Withdrawal of its Reservation to CISG Article 1(b), 2 RENMIN
CHINESE L. REV., 300, 305 (2014).
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Chart A – Direct Application
Scenario

Forum

Party 1

Party 2

Application
of the CISG
1
K
K
K
Yes
2
K
K
NK
No
3
NK
K
K
No
K – Contracting/CISG State; NK- Non-Contracting/CISG State

b. Indirect Application
Where at least one party to the contract is not from a CISG State, CISG
may nevertheless govern parties’ contract by way of the indirect
application pursuant to Article 1(1)(b), in the event the rules of private
international law points to the law of a CISG State.83 The “private
international law,” in other words, is the conflict of laws of the forum.84
Under this approach, the only condition on the application of the CISG is
the choice of law under private international laws. It does not mandate the
forum be in a CISG State because the authority to apply the CISG under
this situation is not the result of performing any obligation under Article
1(1)(b), but instead is the result of following its national private
international law.85 Because the CISG is part of the law of the selected
State, the forum should apply CISG regardless of its “status.” Therefore,
Article 1(1)(b) practically broadens the scope of CISG’s applicability.

83

CISG art. 1(1)(b).
The CISG’s Application under Article 1(1)(b), UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Practice and Theory, § 2.03.
85
Li, supra note 82, at 305.
84
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The application under Article 1(1)(b) can be summarized in the below
chart:
Chart B – Indirect Application
Scenario Forum Party 1 Party 2
PIL Application of the
CISG
1
K*
Yes
K
K
NK
2
NK
No
3
K
Yes
K
NK
NK
4
NK
No
5
K
Yes
NK
K
NK
6
NK
No
7
K
Yes
NK
NK
NK
8
NK
No
K - Contracting/CISG State; NK - Non-Contracting/CISG
State
*Note: the applicable national law determined by the rules
of private international law might be the law of a third
country, different from the nation of Party 1.

2.
Article 95 Reservation—Exclusion the Applicability of the
CISG under Article 1(1)(b)
Where a party from a CISG State deals with a party from a non-CISG
State, Scenario 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Chart B illustrate that the indirect
application has an asymmetrical effect on the domestic law of the parties
to the dispute: if the application is the national law of a CISG State, the
CISG will displace the use of such national law, while the application of
the law of the non-CISG State is unaffected, if it is chosen. This
asymmetry seems to be unacceptable to some countries, as they might be
willing to subordinate their domestic law to the CISG when their residents
deal with traders from similarly situated countries that had ratified the
CISG, but not while contracting with those who have yet to adopt the
CISG. Meanwhile, socialist countries at that time had special laws
specifically designed to govern international trade.86 Agreeing to Article
1(1)(b) would deprive these countries of applying its own law specifically
designed for foreign-trade when it is otherwise applicable. As a result,
Article 95 allows any country to declare, at the time of ratification, not to
be bound by Article 1(1)(b).87 Both China and the U.S. made the

86
87

See supra note 28-33 and accompanying text.
CISG art. 95 (emphasis added).
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reservation, therefore restricting CISG’s application only to Article
1(1)(a).

3.

China’s Reservation

There is no official statement explaining the reasons behind China’s
reservation. Based on the situation in China in the 1980s, several factors
laid the grounds of China’s reservation. First, the main reason of excluding
Article 1(1)(b) was attributed to China’s separate legislation on
international trade. In 1985, parallel to the concern presented by those
socialist countries in Europe, China enacted the FECL to specifically
govern foreign businesses.88 The FECL was drafted based on the prospect
economic reform from a planned economy to a market-based to protect
immature traders, and to buffer the impact of the rapid change.89 Enforcing
CISG’s indirect application would deprive China of the use of its justenacted domestic codes for international sales. The CISG, essentially
representing the product of the laws of Western market economy
countries, was very new to Chinese traders. Without the countervailing
gain of supplanting the foreign law of their partners with the CISG, China
acted prudently to reserve the application of the CISG for the purpose of
protecting its residents whose trading partners are from non-CISG States
from being deprived of the use of Chinese law.90 In addition, unlike Article
96 reservation that can be made at any time, a country cannot reserve the
application of Article 1(1)(b) after ratifying the CISG; thus effectively
waiving the right to make the reservation if it does not file the reservation
at the time of ratification.91 As China just started its legal and political
reform and enacted specific law governing international transactions in
early 1980s, it was understandable for China to make the Article 95
reservation so as to ensure the use of its own law to protect its
inexperienced traders in dealing with parties from non-CISG States. On
the other hand, reversing the Article 95 was a conservative and prudent
decision, i.e., if one is not entirely sure whether the asymmetrical treatment
of the applicable law between CISG parties and non-CISG parties under
Article 1(1)(b) was problematic, one should make the reservation in light
of its right to withdraw at any time.92

88
89
90
91
92

Wang & Andersen, supra note 10, at 155.
Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 66.
Id.
CISG art. 95.
Li, supra note 82, at 310-11.
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4.

Confusion Over the Effect of the Article 95 Reservation

The effect of the Article 95 reservation has also caused controversy.
Apparently, when the rules of private international law appoint Chinese
law to govern disputes between its residents and any party from nonContracting State, the reserving States want their national courts to apply
its own law instead of the CISG. For example, when facing a case between
a Chinese party and an English party (U.K. is a non-CISG State), assuming
that the private international law leads Chinese law to apply, Chinese
courts will apply Chinese law by virtue of the Article 95 reservation not to
be bound by Article 1(1)(b). Such a goal is understandable, as countries
prefer to apply their own law. However, arguments remain as to whether
the effect of this reservation limits only to the reserving State, or whether
it extends to courts and tribunals in foreign States. In order to discern the
controversy, various scenarios should be compared.
For the first scenario, assume that the forum is in Japan, a CISG State,
that the dispute is between a Chinese party and an English party, and that
the private international law leads Chinese law to apply. It is unclear
whether the reservation China made in fact imposes any Japanese courts
an obligation to apply Chinese law, rather than the CISG.93 Because Japan
did not make the Article 95 reservation at the time of ratification, and
because under Article 1(1)(b) the CISG comes into play when the rules of
private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting
State, Japanese courts have legitimate reasons to disregard the reservation
China made.
Germany has taken a step to avoid such confusion by filing an official
“remark,” presenting its view that “parties to the CISG that have made a
reservation under Article 95 are not considered Contracting States within
the meaning of subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1 of the CISG.” 94 Therefore,
when facing the scenario discussed above, German courts will apply
Chinese law, not the CISG. Some scholars believe that such interpretation
of Article 95 reservation is plausible, and should be followed by tribunals
of all countries.95 Others hold the opposite that a CISG State, which did
not make an Article 95 reservation, is obliged to apply the CISG pursuant
to its full acceptance, despite the fact that a party to the dispute is from a
93

See Du Tao (杜涛), Lun Woguo Chexiao dui <Lianheguo Guoji Huowu Xiaoshou
Hetong Gongyue> Diyitiao Diyikuan Dierxiang zhi Baoliu de Biyaoxing (论我国撤销对
《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》第1条第1款第2项之保留的必要性) [The Necessity
for China to Withdraw its Reservation of Article 1(1)(b) of the CISG], 1 INT’L ECON. L. J.
87, 98 (2008) (China).
94
Germany, ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE - TABLE OF CONTRACTING
STATES, available at CISG database, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntriesGermany.html.
95
Du, supra note 93, at 98-99.
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Contracting State made the reservation.96 The underlying grounds for the
latter view are that the fact that just because a country made an Article 95
reservation, it does not change its status of being CISG State, and that the
CISG is a treaty ratified by the forum State.97 This may also be supported
by the CISG itself.98 A related provision, Article 92, which contemplates
the effect of reservation in respect of Part II or Part III of the CISG,
provides that “[a] Contracting State which makes a reservation . . . of Part
II or Part III of this Convention is not to be considered a Contracting State
within paragraph (1) of article 1 of this Convention in respect of matters
governed by the Part to which the declaration applies.”99 The different
wording may reasonably infer that the drafters, by not putting such similar
language in Article 95, intended to continue to treat Article 95 reserving
States as a CISG State.
Nevertheless, the remark Germany made is merely an interpretation
from its perspective.100 It lacks authority to bind other countries, and is not
“authorized by the CISG.”101 The uncertainty as to whether a CISG State
is required to give effect to Article 95 reservation made by another
continues to exist. Therefore, a Japanese court in this scenario has the
discretion to decide whether it will respect China’s reservation. The
potential different treatment among CISG States may cause cases with the
same fact pattern to be subject to different applicable law based on the
forum, leading to forum-shopping for dispute settlement in international
trade.
Additionally, domestic courts of the reserving Contracting State also
have difficulty determining the scope of Article 95 reservation. Assume
that a Chinese court is facing a case between a Chinese party and an
English party, but the governing law under private international law
appoints Japanese law. Given the reservation not to be bound by Article
1(1)(b), should the Chinese court apply Japanese law, instead of the
CISG?102 Scholars have developed two views to analyze such scenario.103
First, under the “forum reservation view,” the reservation has the effect on
the courts of the reserving State.104 The CISG will not apply even if the
forum’s private international law leads to the law of another CISG state.
96

See Markel, supra note 9, at 173.
See id.
98
See Du, supra note 93, at 99.
99
CISG art. 92.
100
Cmt. Germany, ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE–TABLE OF CONTRACTING
STATES.
101
See Markel, supra note 9, at 173.
102
See Du, supra note 93, at 100.
103
The CISG’s Application under Article 1(1)(b), UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Practice and Theory, § 2.03.
104
Id.
97
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Applying this view to the scenario, the CISG would be inapplicable, and
the Chinese court would be obligated to apply Japanese law. This view
appears to be in line with the argument the U.S. government made by
reserving Article 95.105 In order to achieve “maximum clarity” in
international sales transactions, the applicability of the CISG should be
simplified in so that it applies when both parties are Contracting States,
and does not apply when parties from the reserving State contract with a
party from a non-CISG State.106 However, do courts in the reserving State
indeed prefer to apply the law of other CISG State over the CISG, when
they could simply displace it with the CISG? Apparently, national courts
should be more comfortable applying the CISG than the law of other CISG
States. Not only will the latter case cause a significant burden on courts in
translating the statutes of a foreign country, but it will also increase the
likelihood of making mistakes in the application or construction of foreign
law due to lack of expertise.
The alternative view holds that the reservation applies if, and only if,
the private international law leads to the applicability of the law of the
State that has reserved Article 95.107 Under this “selected State reservation
view,” if the selected applicable law is of a CISG State that did not reserve
Article 95, even if the forum State has reserved Article 95, the CISG will
nevertheless apply under Article 1(1)(b). Applying this to the scenario,
because the application of the law is Japanese law, and because Japan did
not reserve the Article 95, the effect of China’s reservation is not triggered.
Pursuant to Article 1(1)(b), the CISG will displace Japanese law in
deciding the dispute. Although this approach, to some extent, helps courts
in the reserving States avoid applying foreign law, it might be criticized
for cherry picking. Under the general belief that the reservation is aimed
to exclude the application of the CISG when a party from non-CISG State
is involved, the “selected State reservation view” will cause confusion to
domestic courts of the reserving State in view of the “bifurcated
application” to bring the CISG back to govern disputes not involving its
own residents.

105

See infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
Markel, supra note 9, at 172.
107
The CISG’s Application under Article 1(1)(b), UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Practice and Theory, § 2.03.
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Overall, the uncertain effect of the Article 95 reservation can be
summarized as:
Scenario

Forum

Party
1

Party 2

PIL

Application
of the
CISG

Applicable
Law

1

K

R

NK

K

?

K/CISG

2

K

R

NK

R

?

3

K

R

NK

NK

No

4

R

R

NK

K

?

5

R

R

NK

R

No

Forum
Reservation
View:
CISG
Selected
State View:
R
NK
(pursuant
to PIL)
Forum
Reservation
View: K
Selected
State View:
CISG
R

6

R

K

NK

K

?

7

R

K

NK

NK

No

Forum
Reservation
View: K
Selected
State View:
CISG
NK

K–Contracting State; R–Reserving Contracting State; NK – Non–
Contracting State;
PIL–Private International Law; ? – Unclear Whether the CISG is
Applicable;

5.

Against Party Autonomy

Due to lack of a regular case reporting system in China, it is difficult
to explore whether the interpretation of the Article 95 reservation has
received uniform and predictable application in Chinese judicial system.
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Imaginably, the CISG has been applied through different approaches in
Chinese courts and tribunals.108 Professor Xiao Yongping, in his survey of
China’s experience with the CISG, identifies problems manifested by the
mistaken interpretation of the Article 95 reservation under Chinese legal
rationale and the “homeward trend” of resorting to Chinese domestic law,
despite the applicability of the CISG.109 For example, in a case between a
Chinese buyer and a Japanese seller,110 the Chinese court concluded in
circular reasoning that the CISG should apply because contracts of
international trade were to be governed by the law that regulated these
contracts.111 In another case where Article 1(1)(a) was met, the court held
that the CISG should apply only in the absence of relevant provisions of
Chinese domestic law.112
In addition to those inconsistent interpretations, a more severe
problem caused by the Article 95 reservation, is its impairment on party
autonomy. UNCITRAL upheld the primacy of party autonomy over the
CISG at the time of drafting the CISG. Delegations from common law
countries first proposed the “opting-in” approach: the CISG will apply
only when parties incorporate it into contracts by reference.113 This
proposal was objected by civil law country delegations.114 After hearing
heated debates, Article 6 was enacted to establish party autonomy under
an “opting-out” means,115 under which parties are free to exclude the
application of the CISG or vary the effect of any its provisions.116
Therefore, even if both sides are from CISG States, the parties have the
right to exclude the “default” application of the CISG under Article 1(1)(a)
if they do not wish to be governed by the CISG.
On the other hand, no other Article of the CISG specifically addresses
the issue of whether parties may make the Convention applicable when it
108

Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 68.
Id. at 101.
110
At the time of this case Japan had not ratified the CISG. See Japan, ELECTRONIC
LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE–TABLE OF CONTRACTING STATES, available at http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-Japan.html.
111
See Nanjing Res. Group v. Tian An Ins. Co. Ltd., Nanjing Branch, Wu Hai Fa Shang
Zi No. 91 (Wuhan Mar. Ct., Sept. 10, 2002), available at http:// cisgw3.law.pace.edu/case
s/020910c1.html.
112
See Hydraulic Punching Machine (P.R.C. v. Italy), CIETAC (2002), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021223c1.html. Note that all CISG arbitration awards are
reported by the CIETAC, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission.
113
See Du, supra note 93, at 105.
114
See id. at 108.
115
See id.
116
CISG art. 6; see also UNCITRAL Digest of CISG Article 6 Case Law, ELECTRONIC
LIBRARY ON CISG DATABASE–CISG BY STATE, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu
/cisg/digest/art06.html.
109
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would not otherwise apply. Assuming that a transaction is between a CISG
party and a non-CISG party, or between two non-CISG parties, and that
both sides wish the CISG to apply; how can they achieve this goal?
Because at least one of the parties in such situations is from a non-CISG
State, Article 1(1)(a) is inapplicable. Given there is no provision in the
CISG expressly granting parties the right to incorporate the Convention to
their contracts, how will the “opting-in” the CISG? Perhaps Article 1(1)(b)
is the only means to accomplish this effect.117 The parties can include a
governing law clause in their contract, and choose the national law of a
CISG State. When the private international law lead to the law chosen by
the parties,118 the CISG will displace the national law and govern any
disputes. Thus, assuming that China did not reserve the application of
Article 1(1)(a), in the event a Chinese party in dealing with an English
party wishes to have the CISG govern their transaction, they could
accomplish this goal by referring to any law of a CISG State in their
agreement. Or in the event an English party conducts businesses with an
Indian party119 in China and both agree to the CISG, they could achieve
the ends simply by include Chinese law as the governing law. However,
the Article 95 reservation China made changes the whole story. The
Chinese party in this scenario could not accomplish its goal because of the
Article 95 reservation. Indeed, party autonomy was denied in a case
between a Chinese party and a Korean party.120 At the time of this case
Korea had not ratified the CISG. The tribunal ruled, after it found that both
parties had agreed to the CISG, that party autonomy should be restricted
in this case because the reservation on Article 1(1)(b) was “to exclude the
application of the CISG to contracts between Chinese parties and parties
in non-Contracting States.”121 Therefore, we can see that the Article 95
reservation might close the door for applying the CISG where at least a
party from a non-CISG State is involved. Traders from non-CISG States
have to resort to other forum in order to opt in the CISG.

117

Du, supra note 93, at 104.
The CISG’s Application under Article 1(1)(b), UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Practice and Theory, § 2.03. (Where parties have included a
governing law clause in their contract, most but not all conflicts rules give effect to the law
chosen by the parties; where parties have not, the particular criteria identified by the
forum’s conflicts rules select the State whose law controls).
119
India is not a CISG State, as of May, 2016.
120
See Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 80-81.
121
Xiao & Long, supra note 39, at 81.
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6.
China’s Withdrawal of Article 96—the Foreshadow of its
Possible Article 95 Withdrawal
In order to secure uniformity and predictability in the application of
the CISG and fully respect for party autonomy, it is imperative for China
to withdraw its Article 95 reservation. In view of China’s recent
withdrawal of Article 96 reservation in 2013, its underlying reasons
suggest a roadmap for China’s potential withdrawal of Article 95 in the
near future. Foremost, like the enactment of the UCL making the Article
96 reservation contrast to its own law, the contemporary Chinese legal
framework does not have any separate legislation on international
contracts. The replacement of the FECL with the UCL signified the legal
reform took placed in China. Thus, the concern over preservation of the
FECL to govern foreign trade has gone since its repeal in 1999.
Additionally, the CISG has great influence on the evolution of Chinese
contract law. At the time of drafting the UCL, the legislators have made
frequent reference to the CISG.122 As such, the need to have Chinese law
govern disputes between Chinese parties and non-CISG parties has
significantly diminished.
The rapid economic development that started in the late 1990s has led
China to be one of the world’s largest trading nations. China no longer
embraces its prior conservative attitude towards global commerce.123
Instead, the active role it plays in international trade, e.g., its participation
in the WTO, demonstrates its positive attitude towards global transactions.
Chinese traders, after experiencing economic reform, have gained
experience through years of worldwide trade, become accustomed to
merchant practice, been familiar with contract rules which are popular in
the Western countries, and learned to avoid contract traps. Therefore, the
apparent original rationale for this reservation, i.e., to protect
inexperienced Chinese traders by specifically designing domestic
legislation on international trade that differs from the CISG, does not exist.
With such favoring attitude towards international transactions, withdrawal
of the Article 95 reservation will promote the development of the CISG.
Especially in East Asia, only Japan, Korea, and Singapore have joined the
CISG (as of May, 2016). Since Singapore also declared the Article 95
reservation, China’s withdrawal will significantly increase the use of the
CISG around China’s neighboring countries.
Maintenance of the reservation contradicts the idea of party autonomy,
preventing parties from using the CISG even when both parties desired it.
122

Id. at 68.
See generally Pattison & Herron, supra note 12, at 461 (“With the adoption of the
‘rule of law’ constitutional provision and with the adoption of the UCL, China was poised
to enter the world of twenty-first century global transactions.”).
123
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Withdrawal will demonstrate China’s respect for party autonomy, allow
parties to opt in to apply the CISG under Article 1(1)(b), and relieve
Chinese judicial officers from applying foreign laws where the private
international law appoints the law of a Contracting State other than China.
Meanwhile, making “opting-in” available in China will encourage
international traders to choose Chinese courts and tribunals as the forum.
As one of the world’s largest trading countries, China has attracted
merchants from every corner of the world to conduct their businesses in
its land. Hence, when a transaction involves a party from a non-CISG State
who wants their contract to be governed by the CISG, withdrawal of the
Article 95 reservation will ensure that the deal will not be spoiled solely
because the reservation prohibits parties from opting in to the CISG, and
discourage forum shopping for the applicability of the CISG. With a
greater number of cases being decided under the CISG in Chinese courts
and tribunal, Chinese judges, lawyers, and traders will enhance their
understanding of the CISG and contribute the interpretation of the CISG
through their published decisions.
Further, as the withdrawal of the Article 96 reservation has resolved
the confusion over the requirements of written form contract, withdrawing
the Article 95 reservation will eliminate the confusion over its effect, and
contribute to consistent and predictable results in practice under Article
1(1)(b). The “reinstatement” of this indirect application in China will
obligate its courts to apply the CISG where at least one party to contract is
from a non-CISG State, and Chinese private international law selects the
law of any Contracting State. Such full acceptance will contribute to a
uniform dispute resolution for transnational trade.
Should the CISG supplant Chinese law pursuant to Article 1(1)(b)
when Chinese law is selected, the interests of Chinese parties will not be
prejudiced, since the Convention provides contracting parties with better
remedy coverage than those under the UCL.124 The principle of
foreseeability of loss under Article 74 of the CISG has been completely
absorbed in the Article 113 of the UCL.125 However, the UCL does not
specify how the amount the damage should be calculated. On the other
hand, Article 75 and Article 76 of the CISG set forth the recovery method,
under which the aggrieved party is entitled to receive the difference
between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction or the
difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at
124

Li, supra note 82, at 314.
Id. at 315. See CISG arts. 74, 113 (Damages for breach of contract consist of a sum
equal to the loss, but may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought
to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract . . . .The amount of losses not
exceed the probable losses which has been foreseen or out to be foreseen when the party
in breach concludes the contract).
125
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the time of avoidance, depending on the act the party took following the
breach.126 Although the Chinese judiciaries have been following the same
principles in practice,127 the lack of express, specific regulations in the
statute grants the judicial branch too much discretion in determination
damages, making the measurement unclear. Thus, given the clear
measurement, the CISG is more favorable than the UCL in providing
guidance for remedy calculation with contracting parties.

IV.

MORE CONVINCING GROUNDS FOR THE U.S. TO WITHDRAW

Unlike the absence of official reasons for China’s reservation, the
reasons why the U.S. made Article 95 reservation are well recorded.128
One of the reasons was to ensure the “maximum clarity” of the
applicability of the CISG.129 The American Bar Association was
concerned about the vagueness of the rules of private international law,
believing it did not provide sufficient clarity compared to the
straightforward test under Article(1)(1)(a) of the CISG.130 American
courts have yet to discuss the unclear effect of Article 95 reservation,
despite the fact that they have generally followed the “forum reservation
view” that courts of the reserving State do not apply the CISG, so long as
there is at least a non-CISG party.131 As discussed above, without a
uniform interpretation of its effect, the unpredictability of the Article 95
reservation is a considerable impediment to the original purpose of the
U.S. to achieve “maximum clarity” in international sales transactions.132
Therefore, the Article 95 reservation does not fully achieve U.S.’s initial
intended effect on “maximum clarity.”
The other ground for the U.S. to exclude Article 1(1)(b) arose out of
its concern for reciprocity.133 The statement from U.S. government that
126
127

CISG arts 75, 76.

Han Shiyuan (韩世远), Chinese Contract Law and the CISG (中国合同法与 CISG),
33(2) Jinan Journal 7, 10-11 (2011) (China).
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Appendix B, Proposed United States Declaration Under Article 95 Excluding
Applicability of the Convention Based On Article 1(1)(b), ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG
DATABASE – MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, available at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/reagan.html (last visited August 14, 2016).
129
Id.
130
Id.
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The CISG’s Application under Article 1(1)(b), UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Practice and Theory, § 2.03.
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Markel, supra note 9, at 174.
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See Appendix B, Proposed United States Declaration Under Article 95 Excluding
Applicability of the Convention Based On Article 1(1)(b), ELECTRONIC LIBRARY ON CISG
DATABASE – MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, available at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/reagan.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2016).
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subparagraph (1)(b) “would displace [U.S.] domestic law more frequently
than foreign law” illustrates its unwillingness and discomfort with CISG’s
replacement of its own domestic law, but not the law of foreign non-CISG
States. Scholars uniformly find that such concern is unwarranted.134 The
CISG, rather than regulating relations between different countries where
the acknowledgment of reciprocity is significant, governs relations
between private parties, i.e., individual traders.135 Similarly, rules of
private international law deal only with an optional choice of law, in which
traders are mostly interested.136 It may lead to the application of the law of
the seller’s country, or the one of the buyer’s. If contracting parties do not
wish the CISG to govern their contract, they may simply exclude the
application of the CISG under Article 6 and include any national law as
the applicable law. As parties should have the right to choose the most
favorable law protecting their relations, the reciprocity rationale
significantly prevents the use of the CISG in the U.S. when at least a party
from a non-CISG State is involved. Although Secretary George P. Shultz
added that “parties who wish to apply the Convention to international sales
contracts not covered by Article 1(1)(a) may provide by their contract that
the Convention will apply,” this option is realistically difficult as analyzed
in the problems China faces due to the reservation. Hence, in order to have
the CISG applicable American parties when dealing with traders from
non-CISG States have to resort to foreign courts. Indeed, a substantial
number of international commercial disputes involving American
concerns have been resolved abroad.137
Some common law practitioners criticize the fact that the CISG
jurisprudence lacks binding authority, i.e., stare decisis, on national
courts.138 In their opinion, only when the interpretation of the CISG is
absolute uniform, will the desired “natural” function be fulfilled.139
Otherwise, the inconsistency in application would encourage traders to
choose the national court that has favorable rulings.140 Facing this
argument, Asa Markel, in his advocate for the U.S. to withdraw the Article
95 reservation, opines that it is not necessary to require the applications
for the CISG be completely uniform and that “discrepancies between
judicial systems do not represent any concerted effort to subvert the
134
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CISG’s uniformity.”141 Especially in the U.S., the UCC continues to
function even it fails to perform absolute uniformity.142 In addition,
Markel, along with scholars from all over the world, believes that the
evolution of CISG case law and tribunal decisions, since its enactment in
1988, contributes to a harmonious interpretation of CISG provisions.143
The availability of electronic databases provides judicial officers with
access to foreign CISG decisions before rendering judgments.144 Though
CISG jurisprudence lacks binding authority, the increasing
acknowledgement of survey decisions from other national courts establish
a framework for consistent rulings.145

V.

CONCLUSION

There is a need for certainty and predictability regarding parties’
relative rights in international sales of goods. After striking balance
between the common law and civil law approaches to contract law, the
CISG was drafted to satisfy the need. Major countries ratifying this
Convention one after the other demonstrate its popularity among
international traders and its acceptance by the world. The development and
acknowledgement of case law interpreting the CISG promotes a
harmonious jurisprudence. Thus, allowing contracting parties to use the
CISG as the governing law will not only facilitate and benefit transactions,
in view of traders’ increasing familiarity with the CISG, but it also better
addresses the problems caused by application of foreign law. In addition
to expenditures on translation, it is highly likely that foreign law might be
construed in an unpredictable fashion.
UNCITRAL intends to promote the CISG through its indirect
application under Article 1(1)(b) in the event at least one party is from a
non-CISG State. However, the Article 95 reservation closes the door for
this approach. Although some may argue that additional signees of the
CISG would make the effect of withdrawal of Article 95 less significant
because the greater number of CISG States will result the application of
the CISG under Article 1(1)(a), this reservation can be viewed as an
unnecessary obstacle against the interest of legal coherence. It is against
parties’ intent to use the CISG governing their contract, and diverges from
the fundamental idea of CISG drafters in providing uniform law for
international sales of goods.
141
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China made the reservation more out of its prudence than resistance,
given the cultural background of its conservative attitude towards
international transactions. Since its ratification of the CISG, China has
experienced enormous changes in its legal system and political reform.
The new contract law was drafted with great reference to the CISG.
Considering its current active role in global trade, it would be parochialism
for China to still hold the reservation. Given sustained growth of
international trade, withdrawal of the Article 95 reservation will facilitate
the development of CISG case law and eliminate its uncertain effect on
the obligation of foreign courts to recognize China’s reservation when they
decide disputes between a Chinese party and a non-CISG party, as well as
on its national courts as to whether the reservation obligates them to
displace the national law of a non-reserving CISG State with the CISG
when no Chinese party is involved. After realizing that the enforcement of
the Article 96 was no longer in line with its modern international trade
policy, China withdrew this reservation in 2013. Hopefully, after being
aware of the unpredictable and inconsistent effect caused by the Article 95
reservation, China will withdraw it in the foreseeable future to fully
promote uniform CISG application.
Sharing with those similar grounds that potentially persuade China to
withdraw, the U.S. should also withdraw its reservation, taking a step
further to lead other reserving countries to consider doing the same. The
original intention of providing “maximum clarity” ends up with causing
the opposite outcome, and the reciprocity concern actually deprives its
own traders from using the CISG. Withdrawal does not automatically
require all parties be bound by the CISG but will provide traders with the
choice of utilizing this uniform legal regime in dealing with international
counterparts. As such, the “benefits” under the Article 95 reservation are
superficial, and withdrawal will contribute to uniform dispute resolutions
under the CISG.

